When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly a dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response to Chrysippus’ paradox was onesto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not per dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is verso dog, then, given the standard account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. In fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply sicuro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar aureola. But the maximality principle may seem onesto be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark durante unison? If per thing is verso dog, shouldn’t it be trapu of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and per fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still durante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later preciso become definitely Dalmatians; some mediante a day, some sopra verso second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary sicuro proclaim per Dalmatian part that is per split second away from becoming definitely per Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one a day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems to favor one of the latter type according sicuro which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the canone account incontri chinalovecupid of identity seems unable on its own esatto handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus verso hair is per dog – and per Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is a multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark con unison no more loudly than Oscar barks macchia.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into a statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into per ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes verso part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by per new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical to \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical sicuro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical to) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical puro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants mediante quantified modal logic are esatto be handled exactly as they are per first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced esatto affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The canone account is thus anzi facie incompatible with the natural preoccupazione that constitution is identity.